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This paper uses the 1937 and 1940 county level census data to estimate what effect did additional 
per capita relief spending have on joblessness in the United States in 1937 and 1940. To account 
for endogeneity in relief spending and its unequal/non-random distribution, an instrumental 
variables approach is used. The results show that additional per capita relief spending lowered 













~ 4 ~ 
 
 
1   Introduction 
     The Great Depression was the most severe economic downturn to ever face an industrialized 
Western country. Almost all major world economies from Japan to the United States were affected 
by the Great Depression. The United States bore much of the brunt of the Great Depression in 
comparison to other industrialized countries. As a result of this gruesome period of economic 
downturn which lasted nearly ten years, a range of macroeconomic and social policy initiatives 
were launched by the federal government in the United States to combat the then prevailing 
economic conditions in the 1930s. Between 1929 and 1933, prices throughout the country fell 
drastically, the industrial production declined by almost half, the real gross domestic product fell 
by 30%, and unemployment had risen by 17 percentage points.  
     To deal with this worsening economic crisis, Americans elected Franklin D. Roosevelt as 
President in 1932 and gave the Democratic Party an overwhelming majority in both houses of the 
Congress. The FDR administration sprang into action immediately to tackle the crisis by launching 
multiple new government programs and spending packages aimed at kickstarting the economic 
activity throughout the country, as well as, providing relief to the unemployed through relief jobs. 
Total spending by the federal government, excluding the foreign affairs and defense portfolios, 
increased by four to six times during the 1930s. The New Deal established a social safety net for 
Americans, provided grants to states and cities to start public works that would provide 
employment to the people laid off, farmers were provided incentives such as cash payments in 
return for altering their farm production. The federal government established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation to insure bank deposits to depositors in US commercial and savings banks 
and the Federal Housing Administration to provide steam to the housing market.  
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     Historians have mostly written about the New Deal in favorable terms. Since the scale of the 
entire program was so large, many times government initiatives worked at cross purposes. Several 
macroeconomic studies have concluded that the New Deal programs had a limited impact on the 
economy recovery, especially when it came to reducing unemployment. In their research, Harold 
Cole and Lee Ohanian (2004) concluded that the National Industrial Recovery Act, which was 
enacted to raise prices and wages, likely contributed in raising unemployment and crippled the 
economy’s long-term growth rate. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), which was designed 
to raise prices of certain farm products by offering monetary incentives to farmers for cutting parts 
of their farm production, is said to have also likely contributed to unemployment of farm labor. 
The New Deal programs are also set to have been greatly affected by political concerns. A growing 
literature has successfully used political instruments, such as voting patterns, in empirical research 
on the New Deal programs. Lowering the prevailing unemployment levels in the early 1930s was 
one of the primary reasons why the federal government started the New Deal program in 1933. 
      Never in the history of the United States had the federal government intervened in the national 
economy on such a large scale to lower unemployment levels and kick start economic activity. 
Consequently, the New Deal program provides researchers a unique opportunity to study the 
outcome of significant government intervention into the economy. There was substantial 
difference in how the New Deal grants were distributed across various counties and the subsequent 
effect they had on lowering employment.  
     The purpose of this paper is to understand what effect, if any, did the New Deal relief spending 
have on joblessness in the United States on a per capita basis at the county level. I examine the 
available New Deal Data made available from past research and the 1930 & 1940 federal censuses 
in my research. As mentioned earlier, the relief spending throughout the counties was greatly 
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influenced by political and other factors. Therefore, following the methods in previous New Deal 
research, I use an instrumental variables approach to capture the political and economic factors 
that likely influenced New Deal relief spending. To my knowledge, my study is the first which 
looks at how per capita relief spending impacted county level joblessness in the United States in 
1937 and 1940. My study uses two political and one economic variable in the model.  
     In the sections that follow, I explain in detail the various components of the relief spending and 
describe the variables I used in my model to understand the relationship between relief spending 
and unemployment during the 1930s. 
1.2   Overview of the New Deal Relief Agencies and Spending 
     There were at least five major relief agencies that operated at different intervals during the 
1930s, namely, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), Civil Works Administration 
(CWA), Works Progress Administration (WPA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the 
National Youth Administration (NYA). The first relief agency, the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA), was established in 1933. Its primary objective according to the Federal 
Works Agency’s final report was to ‘aid in meeting the costs of furnishing relief and work relief 
and in relieving the hardship and suffering caused by unemployment.’ The Civil Works 
Administration (CWA) operated during 1933-34 alongside FERA and was a major contributor of 
relief work. By 1935, the primary federal relief works agency was the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), which was established in 1935. FERA was consequently dissolved after 
WPA’s establishment. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) operated throughout the New Deal 
and provided relief jobs to unemployed and unmarried men between the ages of 17-28. The CCC 
primarily focused on relief projects that conserved and/or developed natural resources on federal, 
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state, and local lands. Approximately 3 million young men were employed by the CCC during its 
existence. Lastly, the National Youth Administration (NYA) focused on providing relief work and 
vocational guidance to unemployed out of school youth between the ages of 16 and 25. The NYA 
operated as part of the WPA from 1935 to 1939. An important note to mention here; because the 
federal government collected data on relief jobs in 1937 and then in 1940, the empirical results in 
this paper may have been different had the data been collected earlier in the 1930s. This is also 
because different relief agencies hired different kinds of workers, as mentioned earlier. When the 
federal government collected its data, most of the relief work was provided by three agencies: 
WPA, CCC, and NYA.  
     The federal government spent about $16.5 billion over a six-year period in relief work grants. 
Some of the grant money was handed down to the states and cities, while the rest was spent by the 
federal government itself. As the federal government’s intervention into the economy increased, 
its percentage share in the total GDP simultaneously increased from 4 to 8 percent. Spending 
increased from $26 million in 1932 to $235 million in 1934 on education, from $217 million to 
$599 on highways, from $2 million to $585 million on public welfare, and from none in 1932 to 
$71 million in 1936 in housing. The overall federal spending increased from 30 percent in 1930 to 
46 percent in the next ten years. Relief grants were primarily distributed through FERA, CWA, 
WPA, and the Social Security Aid to the Blind. The primary goal of these grants was to provide 
relief to the unemployed and low-income people through relief jobs. Therefore, 85% of the grant 
money was used to hire the unemployed. The relief jobs included make-work and maintenance 
activities such as building local roads, post offices, sidewalks, etc. The WPA expenditures were 
part of these federal grants. The WPA projects focused on large-scale construction works such as 
highways, dams, sanitation facilities, etc. Most of these projects required skilled labor force which 
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was not always available on relief rolls. The federal government made efforts to offer a certain 
level of minimum benefits to the people on relief rolls, but ultimately concluded to pay more 
attention to the prevailing wage levels. It also had to find a balance between providing enough 
benefits and hiring as many people as possible to lower extraordinarily high unemployment levels. 
2   Literature Review  
     In the 1937 and 1940 censuses, the Census Bureau counted the workers on relief jobs as 
‘unemployed’. This meant that people who were completely jobless and those who were on relief 
jobs were both counted as unemployed in the official census, and that as relief hiring increased, 
the official unemployment levels also increased. Michael Darby’s paper has attracted significant 
attention on this matter. Darby (1976) argued that classifying relief workers as unemployed had 
produced an incorrect measure of unemployment statistics in the United States during the 1930s. 
He argued that people on relief jobs should be excluded from unemployment statistics.  
     Robert Fleck (1999) is an important paper to understand the relationship between relief jobs 
and unemployment. He also used Darby’s approach and separated relief jobs from the 
unemployment data. Fleck used an instrumental variables approach in his research. He used three 
different political variables which likely affected relief spending in the counties and found that 
‘hiring additional relief workers in a county would not have produced a substantial reduction in 
the number of individuals counted by the Census as jobless’ using 1937 and 1940 census data sets. 
This was a striking conclusion given that Fleck had used Darby’s approach in classifying 
unemployment statistics.  
     Cole and Ohanian (2004) argued that the economic growth in the United States was still subpar 
even after the massive spending by the federal government through the New Deal programs. They 
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wrote that despite some favorable shocks to the economy that were geared toward the money 
supply, productivity, and the banking system, the real GDP per adult was still 27% below trend in 
1939. The authors also mentioned that the anti-trust laws introduced by Congress allowed firms to 
cooperate to keep prices high in many industries and allowed them collective bargaining which 
resulted in unemployment by raising wages above market levels. Cole and Ohanian used a standard 
macroeconomic model and discovered that, had the federal government moderated its interference 
into the economy, the latter would have had returned to normalcy by the late 1930s.  
     John Wallis and Daniel Benjamin (1981) used city-level data from the 1930s and concluded 
that the relief programs did not reduce private employment. In another paper, these authors used 
state level data and concluded that the relief programs had caused substantial displacement in 
private employment. This was an interesting discovery. It indicated that the relief programs had 
created a ‘hardcore’ unemployed group of people in the population for whom getting a job in the 
private sector was unlikely even in a better economy. Robert Margo (1988) using microeconomic 
data from the 1940 also observed that people employed on relief work tended to have different 
characteristics than those who were not (such as less skilled, human capital, etc.). 
3   Data 
     I used data from two different sources. Firstly, I used the 1930, 1937 (partial census) and 1940 
Census datasets from ICPSR File 003 titled ‘Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: 
The United States, 1790-1970’. This ICPSR file provided me with most of the variables which I 
describe in the next section. The 1937 partial census was conducted by the federal government to 
understand the effects of the New Deal programs and whether they had helped lower chronic 
unemployment in the country. However, this census was not conducted in the traditional manner. 
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The Census Bureau obtained data for 1937 from voluntary ‘Employment Report Cards’ which 
were mailed to the government by the people. Consequently, there could have been situations 
where some people chose not to mail the report cards back to the government or that the report 
cards were lost in the mail. For this reason, I expected to see substantial measurement error in the 
1937 sample. The second data source I used for this paper was made available online by Price V. 
Fishback on his website and used in his paper Fishback (2005). 
4   Model 
     The purpose of this paper is to find out what effect, if any, did relief spending have on the 
percentage of joblessness in a county on a per capita basis. Given the unequal and non-random 
distribution of the New Deal relief grants due to their documented political nature, it is likely that 
the relief spending variables suffered from endogeneity. It a well-known fact that relief spending 
during the 1930s was influenced by political considerations. Many past research papers, in their 
attempt to understand the effects of relief spending, considered the use of electoral variables as 
instruments and successfully used them. Several New Deal researchers, such as Price Fishback 
and Robert Fleck, also made use of electoral instruments. The electoral variables might have been 
uncorrelated with the growth in economic activity during the 1930s but still affected relief 
spending. Therefore, it is reasonable to use them in an instrumental variables regression to correct 
for endogeneity. To solve the problem of endogeneity, where the distribution of relief funds was 
likely influenced by political and economic considerations, I use an instrumental variables 
regression. The two-stage IV model is described as following: 
RSPC3340 = α₀ + α₁ INST + α₂ X + eRSPC                                                                    (1) 
         JOBLESS1940 = b₀ + b₁ RSPC3340 + b₂ X + eJOBLESS1940                             (2) 
~ 11 ~ 
 
     Where, RSPC3340 is relief spending per capita from 1933 to 1939; INST is the variable 
representing the instrumental variables used; X represents all the other observable economic 
variables that affected JOBLESS1940; eRSPC represents the error term; JOBLESS1940 represents 
the per capita number of jobless people in a county excluding relief workers; and eJOBLESS1940 
represents the error term in the second stage of the regression.  
     I use three instrumental variables in the model to account for endogeneity in relief spending. In 
order to use instrumental variables, one must make sure that the instruments are correlated with 
relief spending but uncorrelated with the error term of the model. One also must make sure that 
the instruments were important determinants of the relief spending and were not influenced by the 
latter themselves. In order to accomplish this requirement, the instruments must be from prior to 
the start of relief spending. The instruments must also have statistical explanatory power in the 
first stage of the regression. The first electoral instrument I use is voter turnout (Turnout28) from 
the presidential elections in 1928. Voter turnout is an important instrument because it tells us how 
many people voted in the 1928 presidential elections at the county level. Note that I have not used 
the voter turnout from the 1932 presidential election because it may have been correlated with 
changes in joblessness during the early 1930s. Fleck also found evidence that voter turnout was an 
important determinant in the distribution of FERA funds to the counties. The second electoral 
instrument I use is standard deviation of the percentage of people voting for the Democratic party 
during 1896 to 1928 (STD9628). This instrument will provide information on the volatility in the 
Democratic vote bank from 1896 to 1928. The assumption is that Democrats would have likely 
spent more relief funds in those counties where the voters could swing in the direction of either 
party depending on the ruling party’s policies towards them – in this case: relief spending. The last 
instrument I use in the model is church membership in 1926 as a share of population at the county 
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level (Church1930). Church organizations were a major source of charity and relief prior to the 
New Deal. Therefore, the assumption here is that church organizations had the means to support 
those individuals who were under difficult economic conditions during the Great Depression. The 
New Deal relief administrators could have chosen to spend fewer funds in those counties where 
church organizations were active. 
     This paper uses relief spending data from the data source made available by Price Fishback 
(2004). The data file was made publicly available on Fishback’s website to download for research 
work on the New Deal. The original data is from the United States Office of Government Reports, 
which compiled information on relief spending from 1933-1939 in 1941. This paper also uses data 
from Robert Fleck (1999). RSPC3340 is the per capita public works and relief spending from 1933 
to 1939 in 1967 dollars. RSPC3337 is the relief spending from 1933 to 1937 in 1967 dollars. The 
relief spending in the counties was divided by the counties’ populations in the 1940 and 1937. The 
per capita figures from the counties were further divided by 100 to understand the effect of relief 
spending on joblessness as the federal government spent an additional $100 per capita in relief 
work in a county. PctJobless1940 is the percentage of people who were actively seeking work in 
the year 1940, and PctJobless1937 is the percentage of people who were actively seeking work in 
the year 1937. 
     I also add a range of control variables in the model that capture the economic hardship during 
the 1930s in order to avoid a specification error. Firstly, I take into consideration the 
unemployment variables prior to the New Deal that could be linked with the voting patterns and 
economic hardship in 1940. The 1930 Census provided me unemployment data based on gender. 
I have included five unemployment variables from the 1930 census. UnempMale1930 is the per 
capita number of unemployed males who were actively seeking work; UnemplFemale1930 is the 
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per capita number of unemployed females who were actively seeking work; LayoffMale1930 is 
the per capita number of males having jobs, but on layoff, without pay. LayoffFemale1930 is the 
per capita number of females having jobs, but on layoff, without pay; and GainfulWorkers1930 is 
the per capita number of gainful workers. I have added the per capita gainful workers because, 
depending on the unemployment statistics, the more workers there are in a county, the less need 
there would be for relief spending. Please note that this study uses Darby’s classification and 
excludes relief workers from those who were completely unemployed. 
     A few more controls have been added to capture the composition of the labor force in 1940. 
ManufWorkers1940 is the per capita number of manufacturing worker, and FarmPop is the 
fraction of the population that was living on farms. I have added these variables because they may 
be correlated with economic hardship that might not be captured by the unemployment variables 
from 1930. I have added a few more controls that I thought were related to the voting patterns and 
economic hardship and not captured by other variables. Black is the fraction of the population that 
was black in 1940. Native is the fraction of the population that was native in 1940. Urban is the 
faction of the population that was urban in 1940. Over14 is the fraction of the population that was 
over 14 years of age in 1940. PctFarmArea1930 is the percentage of farm area in a county in 1930. 
PopulationM1940 is the 1940 population in millions, while PopulationM1937 is the 1937 
population in millions calculated through the linear interpolation method. Dustbowa is a dummy 
variable which represents 1 is a county was a Dust Bowl county and 0 if it was not. Dust Bowl 
variable has been added because it was a period of severe dust storms during the 1930s that greatly 
damaged American agriculture in the Mid-West region of the country resulting in droughts. 
Counties that suffered from the Dust Bowl may have required additional relief spending from the 
government due to the joblessness resulting there from the decline in agricultural output. Riv1120, 
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Riv2150, and Riv51up are dummy variables and represent the number of rivers in a county that 
pass through 11 to 20 counties, 21 to 50 counties, and 51 or more counties. The reason I have 
added the information on rivers is because access to rivers may have facilitated trade in the 
counties. Rrtsap29 is the retail sales per capita in 1929 in 1967 dollars. This variable gives us a 
picture of economic activity right before the start of the Great Depression and should not, therefore, 
be correlated with the New Deal. LandArea is the county area in square miles. Lastly, I add state 
effects (Div1 to Div9) by grouping nine Census divisions together in order to avoid 
multicollinearity. The use of state effects is very important because I want to prevent inter-
divisional differences in relief spending, politics and unemployment. 
5   Results 
     Table 4 shows the results for the year 1940. The sample includes a total of 2,650 counties. In 
the first stage of the IV regression, all three instruments have the expected signs, but Turnout28 is 
not significantly associated with relief spending though it does have the expected sign. I found that 
both Church1930 and STD9628 are significant at the 5% level. In the second stage of the IV 
regression, there is a negative relationship between PctJobless1940 and RSPC3340. I found that 
an additional $100 per capita spent in relief work by the federal government would lower the 
percentage of jobless in 1940 by 0.37 percentage points. The mean county unemployment in 1940 
was 2.70%. It should be noted that the joblessness percentage was estimated from entire county 
populations, and not just the labor force within a county. Calculating the percentage jobless from 
a county’s labor force would likely give us much larger mean jobless figures. The estimate on the 
coefficient means that with an additional $100 per capita spent in a county, the mean joblessness 
would decrease from 2.70% to 2.33%. The coefficient is significant at the 10% level with a z-score 
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of 1.79. This regression included the census divisions that factor in the inter-divisional differences. 
As mentioned earlier, adding each state dummy separately to factor in within state effects caused 
too much multicollinearity in the sample and many states were highly collinear with each other. 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the state dummies was also quite high. Therefore, an 
alternative way was used to deal with the problem of multicollinearity by grouping the states into 
census divisions and that appeared to have solved the problem to the great extent. The test of 
overidentifying restrictions gave a chi2 value of 1.56 and a p-value of 0.45, thereby rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the instruments were overidentified. Though Church1930, one of the 
instruments, came out as insignificant in the first stage of the regression, the joint significance of 
all the instruments was significant at the 1% level with a F-statistic of 3.78. Usually, however, it 
is better to get a F-statistic of above 10 to remove all doubt about the joint significance of the 
instruments. Testing for endogeneity of RSPC3340, I found that Chi2 score and the F-statistic are 
significant at the 10%. Therefore, RSPC3340 was found to be endogenous. In Table 5, when the 
state effects were removed from the IV regression, out of the three instruments, Church1930 
became insignificant with a z-score of 1.55 but with the expected negative sign on the coefficient. 
The RSPC3340 coefficient is significant at the 1% level with a z-score of 2.39. The coefficient 
says that as relief spending per capita increases by $100 dollars, joblessness in the county would 
decrease by 0.23 percentage points. With a F-statistic of 12.79, the instruments are jointly 
significant. Lastly, RSPC3340 is endogenous with a chi2 score of 5.56 and significant at the 5% 
level. As I had mentioned earlier, one should pay more attention to the regression results that 
includes the inter-divisional state effects. 
     For the 1937 data sample (Table 6), I also found significant results. The coefficient on 
RSPC3337 says that for every $100 (1967 value) per capita spent by the federal government in a 
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county in 1937, the percentage of jobless in that county decreases by .60 percentage points from a 
mean of 3.69% to 3.09%. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level with a z-score of 2.11. All 
the instruments in the first stage of the regression are individually significant at the 5% level, 
except for Turnout28, which came out as insignificant. The instruments are jointly significant at 
the 1% level with a F-statistic of 4.97. The 1937 regression failed the test of overidentifying 
restrictions with a chi2 score of 24.80. However, tests of endogeneity show that RSPC3337 is 
endogenous. A similar story was observed with the 1937 data without inter-divisional state effects 
in Table 7. With a coefficient of -1.34, the z-score is a little higher with a value of 2.71 and 
significant at the 1% level. Since the 1937 data was collected differently than the government 
would during a full census, one should expect to find significant measurement error in the data. 
Therefore, even though the regression results were significant for the 1937 sample, the regression 
still failed the overidentification test and the reader should still be cautious about measurement 
error when interpreting the results.  
6   Conclusion 
     In this paper, I study the effects of per capita relief spending on joblessness in 1940 and in 1937 
at the county level. Departing from the government’s official unemployment definition which 
counted relief workers as part of the unemployed labor force, I counted relief workers as part of 
the employed for reasons mentioned in the paper. The results show that additional relief spending 
at the county level did help in lowering unemployment in 1940 as well as 1937. On average, an 
additional $100 (1967 value) spent created almost four (4) jobs in a county. This means that the 
government, on average, was spending at least $25 to create a relief job in a county in 1940. 
Previous research on the effects of relief work on unemployment has been mixed. Some 
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researchers have found that relief work had a positive impact on unemployment, while others not 
so much. Robert Fleck, who’s research on this topic comes closest to mine, did not find any 
significant relationship between relief work and unemployment. I used a slightly different 
approach by expanding the IV model and adding a few more variables and instruments that I found 
relevant and had not been used in the previous research on the New Deal unemployment and found 
that there was a negative relationship between relief spending and unemployment: as the 
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8   Tables 













out of total 
civilian labor 
force Total Agricultural 
Non-
Agricultural 
1929 49,440 260 49,180 47,630 10,450 37,180 1,550 3.25 
1930 50,080 260 49,820 45,480 10,340 35,140 4,340 9.54 
1931 50,680 260 50,420 42,400 10,290 32,110 8,020 18.92 
1932 51,250 250 51,000 38,940 10,170 28,770 12,060 30.97 
1933 51,840 250 51,590 38,760 10,090 28,670 12,830 33.10 
1934 52,490 260 52,230 40,890 9,900 30,990 11,340 27.73 
1935 53,140 270 52,870 42,260 10,110 32,150 10,610 25.11 
1936 53,740 300 53,440 44,410 10,000 34,410 9,030 20.33 
1937 54,320 320 54,000 46,300 9,820 36,480 7,700 16.63 
1938 54,950 340 54,610 44,220 9,690 34,530 10,390 23.50 
1939 55,600 370 55,230 45,750 9,610 36,140 9,480 20.72 
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Table 2. Per capita New Deal Grants from 1933 to 1939: State level average 
per capita New Deal grants and distributional information for counties in 
nominal dollars. 
  Public Relief Grants 
 Mean Std. Dev Max. Min. 
New England (Division 1)     
Connecticut 230.9 82.9 161.9 417.8 
Maine 268.4 259.5 130.2 1113.0 
Massachusetts 352.9 226.7 231.7 1119.2 
New Hampshire 180.9 41.9 132.6 264.1 
Rhode Island 323.0 164.0 211.1 604.5 
Vermont 194.8 96.2 122.3 512.5 
Mid-Atlantic (Division 2)     
New Jersey 289.3 139.3 133.0 717.8 
New York 229.3 80.5 120.6 586.4 
Pennsylvania 300.5 82.2 126.9 492.0 
East North Central (Division 3)     
Indiana 226.4 122.1 64.7 699.9 
Illinois 262.4 106.8 78.7 632.7 
Michigan 325.8 194.5 120.7 1269.2 
Ohio 264.2 103.1 106.2 599.9 
Wisconsin 281.3 161.6 100.0 1051.9 
West North Central (Division 4)     
Iowa 158.0 65.0 54.3 337.6 
Kansas 268.9 106.9 79.8 634.3 
Minnesota 253.8 114.3 52.1 619.5 
Missouri 205.1 76.1 87.5 558.9 
Nebraska 221.8 106.1 38.3 680.4 
North Dakota 369.1 132.2 152.9 837.9 
South Dakota 461.5 161.0 0.5 1033.9 
South Atlantic (Division 5)     
Delaware 221.6 66.0 145.9 267.1 
Florida 247.1 144.2 87.1 834.2 
Georgia 120.6 102.9 41.7 1242.3 
Maryland 192.0 125.9 59.3 482.4 
North Carolina 126.2 70.7 48.9 432.0 
South Carolina 181.8 101.4 93.2 626.2 
Virginia 114.4 87.1 40.1 649.7 
West Virginia 262.9 97.3 103.5 585.4 
East South Central (Division 6)     
Alabama 123.2 51.7 53.4 307.1 
Kentucky 164.4 76.2 50.6 707.8 
Mississippi 140.3 61.5 55.9 328.9 
Tennessee 121.0 54.7 43.0 381.3 
West South Central (Division 7)     
Arkansas 181.4 59.5 75.4 426.5 
Louisiana 153.4 108.3 52.0 733.8 
Oklahoma 278.0 140.2 114.9 1182.0 
Texas 202.0 211.6 34.4 2667.0 




















Mountain Division 8)     
Arizona 902.5 1535.0 257.7 6215.4 
Colorado 410.2 218.0 159.9 1179.3 
Idaho 333.4 126.0 159.5 740.7 
New Mexico 425.4 257.6 97.7 1426.9 
Montana 537.0 241.0 199.6 1372.3 
Utah 440.6 217.3 208.2 1264.2 
Nevada 1082.5 724.8 443.7 3433.3 
Wyoming 482.9 168.0 246.6 842.2 
Pacific (Division 9)     
California 309.7 305.2 95.2 1969.5 
Oregon 270.9 206.6 104.0 1016.8 
Washington 295.7 145.2 116.2 839.8 
~ 23 ~ 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PctJobless1940 3,000 2.702 1.423 0.085 12.386 
RSPC3340 3,033 2.45 2.167 0.005 62.154 
RSPC3337 3,033 1.792 2.173 0 78.374 
Turnout28 3,033 0.276 0.143 0.011 0.684 
Church1930 3,033 0.483 0.242 0 4.251 
STD9628 3,032 10.244 5.004 1.136 44.738 
Jobless1937 3,033 0.037 0.017 0.001 0.136 
ManufWorkers1940 2,678 0.031 0.039 0 0.444 
Black 3,033 0.106 0.178 0 0.855 
FarmPop 3,032 0.464 0.216 0 1 
Over14 3,000 0.733 0.047 0.569 1.062 
Native 3,033 0.963 0.046 0.742 1.257 
Urban 3,033 0.225 0.244 0 1 
PopulationM1940 3,033 0.04 0.127 0 4.063 
PopulationM1937 3,033 0.039 0.125 0 4.039 
PctFarmArea1930 3,033 64.543 27.406 0 146.596 
Dustbowa 3,033 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Riv1120 3,033 0.24 0.452 0 2 
Riv2150 3,033 0.139 0.375 0 3 
Riv51up 3,033 0.092 0.293 0 2 
UnempMale1930 3,033 0.009 0.008 0 0.085 
UnempFemale1930 3,033 0.001 0.002 0 0.033 
LayoffMale1930 3,033 0.003 0.004 0 0.065 
layoffFemale1930 3,033 0.001 0.001 0 0.041 
GainfulWorkers1930 3,033 0.365 0.044 0.25 0.707 
Rrtsap29 3,029 539.95 270.154 0 1842.493 
LandArea 3,033 972.974 1319.396 25 20131 
Div1 3,033 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Div2 3,033 0.048 0.213 0 1 
Div3 3,033 0.143 0.35 0 1 
Div4 3,033 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Div5 3,033 0.175 0.38 0 1 
Div6 3,033 0.12 0.325 0 1 
Div7 3,033 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Div8 3,033 0.091 0.288 0 1 
Div9 3,033 0.044 0.204 0 1 
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Table 4. 1940 Two Staged Least Squares Regression Results with Inter-Divisional State Effects  
1940 RESULTS WITH TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
FIRST STAGE SECOND-STAGE 
Number of Observations 2, 650 2,650 
R-Squared 0.33 0.44 




RSPC3340     -0.372 -1.79 
Jobless1937 25.34 11.68 26.94 4.71 
ManufWorkers1940 -7.18 -7.26 -5.739 -3.33 
Black -0.50 -1.44 -1.129 -5.3 
FarmPop -1.76 -3.75 -2.751 -6.23 
Over14 5.08 3.26 3.167 2.22 
Native -3.92 -3.06 -4.012 -3.48 
Urban -1.19 -2.94 -1.097 -3.39 
PopulationM1940 -0.41 -2.38 -0.094 -0.6 
PctFarmArea1930 0.00 -0.76 -0.004 -3.39 
Dustbowa 0.58 2.11 -0.06 -0.28 
Riv1120 0.14 1.65 0.056 1.08 
Riv2150 -0.01 -0.15 0.044 0.83 
Riv51up 0.27 3.01 0.485 6.1 
UnempMale1930 48.12 2.92 73.378 6.25 
UnempFemale1930 -129.98 -3.76 -60.33 -1.51 
LayoffMale1930 -0.60 -0.06 26.39 2.65 
LayoffFemale1930 60.09 1.53 63.524 1.86 
GainfulWorkers1930 2.66 1.66 -0.053 -0.05 
Rrtsap29 0.00 -0.75 -0.0001 -0.85 
LandArea 0.00 2.09 0.0001 1.24 
Div1 0.87 1.81 0.2 0.78 
Div2 1.09 2.65 0.75 2.82 
Div3 1.55 3.69 -0.041 -0.12 
Div4 1.40 3.27 0.043 0.14 
Div5 1.39 3.03 0.064 0.2 
Div6 1.05 2.18 0.144 0.52 
Div7 1.03 2.53 0.216 0.81 
Div8 2.11 6.08 0.743 1.64 
Turnout28 0.18 0.30     
Church1930 -0.38 -2.19     
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Table 5. 1940 Two Stage Least Squares Regression Results without Inter-Divisional State Effects 
1940 RESULTS WITH TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
FIRST STAGE SECOND-STAGE 
Number of Observations 2, 650 2,650 
R-Squared 0.30 0.54 




RSPC3340     -0.230 -2.39 
Jobless1937 22.659 10.54 24.612 9.55 
ManufWorkers1940 -8.088 -7.83 -4.859 -4.56 
Black -0.345 -0.09 -1.154 -6.78 
FarmPop -2.037 -4.10 -2.630 -8.56 
Over14 0.749 0.53 1.973 1.94 
Native -2.894 -2.34 -3.650 -4.98 
Urban -0.871 -2.33 -0.923 -4.48 
PopulationM1940 -0.438 -1.96 -0.010 -0.07 
PctFarmArea1930 -0.001 -0.30 -0.006 -5.55 
Dustbowa 0.750 2.78 -0.043 -0.26 
Riv1120 0.154 1.77 0.076 1.72 
Riv2150 -0.091 -1.10 0.110 2.26 
Riv51up 0.313 3.66 -0.406 6.05 
UnempMale1930 50.620 3.23 64.516 8.14 
UnempFemale1930 -124.900 -3.77 -51.247 -1.71 
LayoffMale1930 -1.246 -0.13 27.875 2.83 
LayoffFemale1930 54.880 1.45 66.159 2.33 
GainfulWorkers1930 1.949 1.14 -0.215 -0.28 
Rrtsap29 0.000 -1.20 0.000 -0.11 
LandArea 0.000 2.42 0.000 1.50 
Turnout28 2.152 5.10     
Church1930 -0.230 -1.55     
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Table 6. 1937 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Results with Inter-Divisional State Effects 
1937 RESULTS WITH TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
FIRST STAGE SECOND-STAGE 
Number of Observations 2, 650 2,650 
R-Squared 0.24 - 




RSPC3337   -0.601 -2.11 
ManufWorkers1940 -4.965 -4.18 -0.656 -0.38 
Black -1.005 -1.83 -1.648 -3.9 
FarmPop -1.329 -2.34 0.099 0.18 
Over14 4.107 2.19 -1.299 -0.74 
Native -4.108 -3.31 -1.347 -0.79 
Urban -1.403 -2.76 0.335 0.64 
PopulationM1937 -0.206 -1.45 0.467 1.81 
PctFarmArea1930 -0.006 -3.01 -0.028 -9.11 
Dustbowa 0.516 1.98 -0.101 -0.28 
Riv1120 0.062 0.66 0.089 1.08 
Riv2150 0.145 1.73 0.429 3.96 
Riv51up 0.237 2.23 0.458 3.3 
UnempMale1930 40.670 2.42 58.393 3.56 
UnempFemale1930 -113.800 -3.14 -43.297 -0.95 
LayoffMale1930 -4.587 -0.49 37.482 2.98 
LayoffFemale1930 21.106 0.80 -19.514 -0.56 
GainfulWorkers1930 6.357 2.30 3.532 1.52 
Rrtsap29 0.000 -0.82 -0.001 -3.82 
LandArea 0.000 1.98 0.000 0.77 
Div1 1.236 2.33 0.571 1.33 
Div2 1.549 3.09 0.864 1.92 
Div3 1.941 3.62 0.512 0.93 
Div4 1.815 3.42 1.044 1.93 
Div5 2.097 3.57 0.477 0.74 
Div6 1.947 3.26 1.445 2.35 
Div7 1.524 3.05 0.893 1.72 
Div8 1.889 4.68 0.608 1.1 
Turnout28 -0.461 -0.71   
Church1930 -0.447 -2.40   
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Table 7. 1937 Two-Staged Least Squares Regression Results without Inter-Divisional State Effects 
1937 RESULTS WITH TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES 
FIRST STAGE SECOND-STAGE 
Number of Observations 2, 650 2,650 
R-Squared 0.22 - 




RSPC3337     -1.342 -2.71 
ManufWorkers1940 -5.573 -4.61 -6.679 -2.03 
Black -0.301 -0.56 -2.231 -3.93 
FarmPop -1.748 -2.75 -0.940 -0.7 
Over14 0.053 0.03 -2.483 -1.15 
Native -2.583 -2.1 -3.005 -1.4 
Urban -1.122 -2.43 -0.253 -0.25 
PopulationM1937 -0.156 -0.78 0.404 1.14 
PctFarmArea1930 -0.004 -1.16 -0.029 -6.97 
Dustbowa 0.609 2.33 0.342 0.63 
Riv1120 0.067 0.7 0.110 0.7 
Riv2150 -0.031 -0.41 0.406 2.84 
Riv51up 0.255 2.57 0.777 3.62 
UnempMale1930 39.932 2.45 82.070 2.43 
UnempFemale1930 -103.512 -3.01 -130.531 -1.73 
LayoffMale1930 -6.897 -0.73 31.180 1.71 
LayoffFemale1930 14.110 0.52 -13.670 -0.28 
GainfulWorkers1930 5.243 1.87 8.087 2.01 
Rrtsap29 -0.001 -1.38 -0.002 -2.23 
LandArea 0.000 2.02 0.000 1.04 
Turnout28 0.682 1.63 10.109 3.31 
Church1930 -0.271 -1.77     
STD9628 0.024 2.26     
~ 28 ~ 
 
 
